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BOOK REVIEWS
THI MORAL DECISION; RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OV
AmERICAN LAW. By Edmond Cahn. Indiana University Press,
1955. Pp. ix, 342. $5.00.
One of the most original and penetrating writers in American
legal literature today is Edmond Cahn.' His background of twenty-
three years in active law practice in New York City gives him a wise
practical insight. During that period he became a legal theorist of
outstanding ability,2 and since 1950 he has devoted himself to teach-
ing constitutional law and jurisprudence and writing on legal subjects.
His latest book is not intended only for lawyers and students of
the law. It is addressed to "any literate individual who is troubled by
the moral confusion of the times," which I would suppose includes
all of us who read the newspapers, not to mention the modern novel.
But this certainly is a book that will particularly interest and instruct
the thoughtful lawyer.
"What moral guides can be found in American law?" Professor
Cahn asks. Morals and ethical thought are sources of the law. The
traditional statement of the police power of legislative bodies con-
ceded that at the very least they could deal with matters of "health,
safety and morals." The corpus of the judge-made common law
bears many indications of concern with moral problems, as indicated
by such words and phrases as fraud, malice, fault and good faith. But
it is apparent that law and morals are not identical. The law deals
with many problems that do not have moral overtones, that are, as
Professor Cahn says, "morally neutral." Conversely, the phrase
found in many judicial opinions that a party may have "a moral, but
not a legal, right" indicates that the law does not always accept the
moral answer as controlling. Since the law so often deals with
moral problems, Professor Cahn suggests that the legal resolution of
such questions might be instructive to moral and ethical theory. Thus
the law repays its debt to morals and becomes a source for ethical
thought.
Part I of the book is relatively short, and deals with the theory of
moral decision. Professor Cahn is one of those who thinks that the
proof of the moral make-up of an individual lies in his response to
1. Professor of Law, New York University.
2. Since 1944, Mr. Cahn has contributed the chapter on Jurisprudence to the
ANNUAL SuRvit oF AMERICAN LAW.
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a specific moral problem. The goal of moral thought is to produce
the correct moral decision. The human characteristics which respond
to a situation and contribute to the moral decision may be regarded
as "the moral constitution". The moral constitution consists of our
proneness to dramatize the events of our lives, our capacity to pro-
ject this feeling to the similar problems and predicaments of others,
and our sense of wrong, an instinctive reaction, part rational, part
physical, to an act of moral wrong. These being the elements of the
moral constitution, it is apparent that the concrete case provides the
necessary setting for its operation. Only the concrete case can be
dramatized. Only here is the moral constitution faced with the re-
sponsibility for making a binding decision. Only to a specific set
of facts can the sense of wrong respond. In short, the lawyer's em-
phasis on the existence of a "case or controversy" provides an
insight that moral theory should find useful.
Here is where Professor Cahn feels that the experience of the
law should aid the moralist. Too often ethical thought is "Utopian ;"
it is so far removed from the concrete moral problem as to offer
little aid in providing a clear solution. On the other hand, the court-
room often presents moral problems in a highly specific setting. The
courtroom dramatizes the problem, and it demands a solution, so that
its treatment is responsible, not Utopian. Legal experience can be
useful in two ways: it poses many concrete moral problems on which
ethical theory can work; and it offers the law's solution to those
problems.
Parts II and III contain the law's lessons for morals, in sub-
stantive and procedural law respectively. Here each type of prob-
lem is introduced by a brief summary of an actual litigated case.
These chapters are well worth the lawyer's careful reading if only
for their insight into the legal problems involved. But the emphasis
is not on the legal analysis of the case. Rather each case is used as
a springboard for speculation about an area of moral problems. In
Professor Cahn's language, these cases were chosen for their "pris-
matic qualities," for their ability to reveal a spectrum of moral prob-
lems. The author's choice of cases is unerring.
These two Parts, which comprise the bulk of the book, are de-
lightful reading for the lawyer. For instance, the first case is United
States v. Holmes.3 The ship William Brown struck an iceberg 250
miles from Newfoundland, and the first mate, seaman Holmes and
six other seamen, and 32 passengers piled into a leaky long-boat built
3. 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
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to hold only half their number. The situation was desperate as the
ship slowly began to sink. The first mate ordered the crew to throw
all male passengers overboard. Fourteen passengers were thrown
into the cold waters of the North Atlantic, and the long-boat was
saved. Seaman Holmes was indicted for murder. Using this case
as a springboard, Professor Cahn asks, what is the value of a human
life in the eyes of the law? Jurisprudence has offered three solutions
to the Holmes problem: the ruling of the trial judge in Holmes trial,
that, if time permitted, lots must be drawn so that chance could de-
cide the vexing question; the suggestion that the whole question of
whether the action was excused by the circumstances be left, as are
so many hard legal problems, to a jury; the thought that while pos-
sible hope of rescue remains, no life could be sacrificed. Cahn re-
jects all three, deciding that in such a case, where the "morals of the
last days" apply, they all must wait and die together, unless brave
volunteers give their lives to lighten the boat. Here as elsewhere in
the book the author reveals the bold originality of his thinking. The
solution does not strike one as the most likely to insure the perpetua-
tion of the species, but it is not unlike the answer given by the three
famous Army chaplains, who gave their lifebelts and went down with
a troopship that others might live.
In this fashion, Professor Cahn goes through the whole range of
legal experience with moral problems. The material dealing with
the domestic relations is superbly treated. He begins with the right
of a child to be respected as a human being having his own peculiar
characteristics, as illustrated by the turntable "attractive nuisance"
cases.4 The moral problems of family life, of extra-marital sexual
relationships, and of divorce and annulment are analyzed. Professor
Cahn indicts persuasively on moral grounds the legal doctrines per-
mitting monetary compensation for "heart-balm" cases- breach of
promise of marriage, alienation of affections and criminal conversa-
tion. He also indicts in strong terms the doctrine of recrimination
as a defense to a suit for a divorce. The judicial process is sullied
by the former type of case, and is not competent to deal with the
latter, he asserts. Invoking the analogy of separation of powers in
constitutional law, he shows that whether a marriage should continue
is a problem often better handled by an administrative than a judicial
tribunal. The dramatization in an adversary proceeding of marital
infidelity and strife can only destroy whatever possibility might re-
main of saving the marriage.
4. Railway Co. v. Stout, 17 Wallace 657 (1873) is cited.
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3
et al.: BOOK REVIEWS
Published by Scholar Commons,
Boor, Riviws
Chapters dealing with the conduct of business and business with
government explore a broad range of problems. Fraud and misrepre-
sentation, business ethics and the moral implications of cheating on
income taxes are discussed. The leading case of Tuttle v. B .............
in which the defendant, activated solely by malice, opened a barber
shop to put the plaintiff's shop out of business by ruinous competi-
tion, and the Minnesota mortgage moratorium case, 6 are brilliantly
employed to develop a theory of the moral use of the power that comes
with command over wealth. Judge Cardozo's famous decision in the
Wagner case7 - "Danger invites rescue" - leads to a discussion of
the story of the Good Samaritan and its moral lessons. The part
dealing with the substantive law closes with a chapter on death, so
that the whole range of life has been explored.
The dosing part deals with the moral lessons of adjective law.
Again litigated cases are summoned to pose the problems. The great
lesson which American procedural law has for morals is summed
up by Professor Cahn in the phrase "due process of moral decision."
The essentials of due process of law, as developed in constitutional
decisions, apply to the making of the moral decision. No one should
be accused unless he has notice before he acts that his act is violative
of a recognized moral standard. He must be told that he is accused
and permitted to present his evidence and argue his case. The tribunal
must be unbiased, and if the accusation is grave, the accused is en-
titled to counsel. Irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial evidence
must be evaluated as such. All these considerations are considered
applicable to moral due process, save possibly the requirement of
counsel. Of course, the moral decision is made within an individual;
the judge-jury division of function is lackdng. But that man must
evaluate the evidence, and by evaluating incompetent evidence in terms
of its materiality, must give the evidence the cool appraisal that is
given by a good judge.8
Professor Cahn uses the decree in the Segregation Cases9 to in-
troduce discussion of compromise and negotiation. Given the de-
5. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). Professor Cahn uses only the initial
to designate the litigant whose moral conduct is at issue in the litigation.
6. Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 393 (1934).
7. Wagner v. International Railway Co., 232 N.Y. 176 (1921).
8. An example in the law in which something strikingly similar to "due
process of moral decision" as described by Professor Cahn is employed in the
procedure for summary courts-martial, in the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, Act of 5 May, 1950. A summary court under the Act is charged with act-
ing as prosecutor, defense counsel and judge, and must carefully keep its
functions separate in order to grant what is called "military due process" to the
accused.
9. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cision on the substantive law,' 0 that decree is what the diplomats
would call a conciliatory decision. The provision in the decree that
adjustment will be gradual and will take into account varying local
needs provides a framework for negotiation. Professor Cahn's dis-
cussion of the techniques of negotiation is witty and instructive.
The federal naturalization statute requires an applicant to show
that for the five years immediately preceding his petition, he has been
"a person of good moral character." Can a person who has commit-
ted a mercy killing within that period meet the statutory test? How
can a judge decide whether a person is of "good moral character"?
Professor Cahn uses a case raising these problems 1" to present his
view that the making of the moral decision is the responsibility of
each of us - "The act of individual judgment must belong to him
who bears the name of judge." He takes to task one of the most
profound thinkers in American law, Learned Hand, for his dissent-
ing view in that case, that "the generally accepted moral conventions
current at the time," and not the judge's own responsible views, pro-
vide the material for decision. In the legal as in the moral forum,
the author feels that the responsibility of judgment is personal.
The layman's caricature of the lawyer is not complimentary. Even
the intelligent layman frequently is suspicious of the role of the
lawyer in our society, and afraid of involvement in litigation. Some-
one must lose in every lawsuit. The layman too often is reminded
of the summons, the complaint and the execution. Seldom does he
think of the great gifts of order and justice that the law is attempt-
ing to give to society. A book like Professor Cahn's serves the
legal profession well by reminding the reader that many jurists, law-
yers and law teachers are deeply concerned with the moral and social
implications of their profession, that the law has had a great deal of
experience with moral prqblems, and that it has resolved many of
them in a wise and enlightened manner.
CHARL S H. RANDALL, JR.*
10. Professor Cahn has discussed at length some of the substantive aspects
of the decision in 1954 ANNUAl, SURVty OF AMERICAN LAw, Jurisprudence, pp.
809 to 828.
11. R v. United States, 162 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
cAssociate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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Limz AND LI B. By Robert Wallace, Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1955.
Pp. 250. $3.50.
Life and Limb should not be advertised as a printed book, for in
intellectual reality, it is an etching. It is etched with the acid of
sarcastic (see page 44), slanted journalism, kissing Melvin Belli on
each cheek, feasting with him to gain from his own lips some of the
light that shines forth from his soul, but reflecting that light in a
vicious cast. The book is acidulous and burning where its words fall
harshly upon the great man whose biography it purports to be.
Actually, this book, though a great book, and a magnificent example
of clarity and prose, of biting sarcasm and scholarly research, is,
wittingly or unwittingly, a terrific propaganda blast to help insurance
companies keep more of the premiums they collect for themselves
rather than distribute those premiums in payment to persons who are
injured.
The first fifty pages form an apologia for insurance companies
with scant breath wasted on the cries of the tortured bodies racked
by chromium-plated bumpers or crushed by hurtling wheels. After
fifty pages the book gets down to its real purpose of chronicling the
life of Melvin Belli, a great trial lawyer. Still, the anecdote of the
stuffed quail, though very funny, does hardly seem designed to cast
either credit or respect upon anybody.
Aghast at the merciless innuendos and Parthian shots of this mo-
dern journalistic iscariotism, I called Melvin Belli when partway
through the book to learn his reaction to this attack on him as a man.
Incensed myself at its unfairness, I expected Belli to be up in arms,
but, as is characteristic of a big man, he generously said, "An attack
upon me is unimportant. Perhaps the book will serve to educate
the public to the great need for more adequate awards, more closely
to compensate men and women who suffer for wrongs done to them.
If the book serves that purpose, I shall be glad."
He tried to stop its publication by injunction, but failed.
The book cannot but be provocative. It excites. It fills one with
fear as one imagines one's self a defendant, but it also makes one
glad such champions as Belli live and serve, in case one should ever
be injured.
A vignette from the text which illustrates Belli's greatness is this
from page 62:
Ernie Smith, a young colored boy who had been serving a
term in San Quentin for a felony, got into a fight in the exer-
cise yard of the prison, killed a man, and was indicted for mur-
1955]
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der. For all intents and purposes Smith was in the gas chamber
waiting for the cyanide pellets to drop when Belli came along.
Belli interviewed Smith in the office of the captain of the
guard at San Quentin. 'I did it in self-defense,' Smith said. 'I
knocked him down and then I kicked him a couple of times be-
cause he had a knife and was going to throw it at me.'
Belli asked Smith how he expected a jury to believe that the
dead man had actually had a knife - in prison - and was
amazed to discover that most of the convicts in San Quentin car-
ried knives. 'That's right,' said the captain of the guard. 'We
let them have them -up to a certain length. We take the big
ones. Look.' He opened a desk drawer and showed Belli a
mass of more than a hundred knives that had been confiscated
from the prisoners.
'Before the trial I served a subpoena deces tecum on the cap-
tain, ordering him to come to court and bring his drawer of
knives,' Belli says. 'I offered the drawer in evidence, and as I
was carrying it past the jury a hell of a thought struck me. I
knew my whole case was in that drawer. Every argument I
had was in there. That boy was going to live or he was going
to die because of what was in that drawer, and so I suddenly
stopped, and I dropped the damned thing, and I spilled a hun-
dred knives all over the floor. They were the meanest-looking
knives you ever saw, made of broken saw blades and files with
tire-tape handles. The jurors took one look and they knew
it was self defense. Demonstrative evidence. I might never
have sold them on the idea that Smith was trying to save his
own life when he killed the other boy if I had just called witnesses
and talked and let them peek into the drawer. But when I
dropped it, I proved it.'
Belli has been "proving it" since with verdicts that are amongst
the largest in the history of personal injury and death litigation.
At page 169, the biographer expounds his own philosophy: "So-
ciety cannot and should not compensate every careless or accident-
prone individual who insists on jaywalking, thrusting his head out the
window of a moving train, moving against a red light, or otherwise
laying himself open to injury. Even in cases less clearcut, the doc-
trine fairly applies."
Though the author speaks those sentiments, giving them gratuitous-
ly in this "biography," Life and Limb does in fairness report that im-
partial and fair-minded jurors, presumably with no advertising space
[Vol. 8
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to sell to insurance companies, have seen fit over the years to award
to Melvin Belli's clients many, many verdicts of $100,000.00 or more
for pain, suffering, death, disablement. It is not suggested anywhere
that the disabled or crushed humans could afford to lose their lives
or limbs; it is just made to seem awful that they employed Belli to
help them in their terrific fights for adequate awards.
Will you think the awards have ever been "adequate" for the agony?
To learn the answer to that, you will have to read this maddening
but fascinating book. Don't start it unless you cancel your appoint-
ments for a couple of hours, for you will not want to put it down
till the last tumultuous paragraph has cascaded through your mind,
mores, and morality.
HuGH G. HtAD, JR.*
-LL.B., Atlanta Law School; Member, Georgia bar and Atlanta Bar Association.
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